2

2/34 Armor - The Dreadnoughts Of Desert Storm

Case Narrative

U.S. DEMOLITION OPERATIONS AT THE KHAMISIYAH AMMUNITION STORAGE POINT

Table of Contents

Summary
Introduction
Desert Storm Activities
Destruction of Munitions at Khamisiyah ASP
UNSCOM Investigations at Khamisiyah
The Public Inquiry
Potential for Exposure - Plume Analysis
Who was at Khamisiyah?
TAB A - Acronym Listing/Glossary
TAB B - Units Identified as Being Within a 50 Kilometer Radius of Khamisiyah ASP
TAB C - Bibliography
END NOTES

END NOTES

[1] Objective GOLD was a military designation for the area around what was then referred to as the Tall al Lahm ASP. GOLD was an Objectiveective for the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) during the Ground War phase. The XVIII Corps Desert Shield Chronology February 1991, 26 February 1991 entry; and Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory, (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), Figure 5-1.

[2] This highway was referred to as "Highway 8" or "MSR [military supply route] 8." It became the major redeployment route to reach MSR "Texas" and "Virginia," which then led back into Saudi Arabia and the units' assembly areas. 20th EN Bde General Update and Unit Location Report, 3 March 1991.

[3] DoD News Briefing, 21 June 1996.

[4] Since Khamisiyah was not specifically listed as a suspected chemical weapons storage site, it was considered to be a conventional weapons storage site. CIA Timeline on Activities Involving Khamisiyah Depot, for June 1996 PAC briefing.

[5] XVIII Corps CTOC 26 February 1991 log entry, and supporting handwritten action message form.

[6] Khamisiyah was targeted 10 times, however, only 8 missions were completed; 5 were B-52G raids and 3 were attacks by fighter/bomber aircraft. Gulf War Air Planning Staff (GWAPS) database query log.

[7] When the 82nd Airborne Division arrived at Khamisiyah on 1 March 1991, they saw evidence of this bombing destruction. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video, 15 November 1996.

[8] Testimony by General (ret.) Schwarzkopf, 29 January 1997, before the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee.

[9] Commander's Guidance for Disposition of Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions, USCINCCENT, 241200Z FEB 91

[10] Iraqi Chemical Munition Disposition, COMUSARCENT, 211400Z FEB 91. See other document per this reference.

[11] Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions, XVIII Corps (ABN), 270845Z FEB 91

[12] Memo, Commander, 24th ID(M), SUBJ: Destruction of Enemy Equipment and Supplies, 16 February 1991.

[13] Commander's Guidance for Disposition of Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions, USCINCCENT, 241200Z FEB 91, para. 3D.

[14] Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory, (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), p. 257-259

[15] An XVIII Corps February 26,1991 log entry, and the supporting handwritten action message form.

[16] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 27 February 1991.

[17] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 28 February 1991.

[18] 2/505 one page history summary.

[19] 82nd Chemical Officer's handwritten message to 2nd ACR Chemical Officer, 23 March 1991, describing activities that had occurred in AO.

[20] The 37th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 82nd Div (ABN) for this purpose. The 37th Engineer Battalion was tasked through its chain of command, the 937th Engineer Group and the 20th Engineer Brigade.

[21] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 2 March 1991, pp. 3-4, 8.

[22] Personal recollection of unit commander. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[23] Documented in interviews with soldiers present. Unit 1SG interview, Lead Sheet 843, July 1996.

[24] A (-) symbol indicates that the unit has detached part of its unit strength (personnel or units) to another area or mission. (Army manual FM 21-30, p. B-3; FM 101-5-1, Ch. 2, Sec. IV, p. 2-73). In this instance, the 37th EN Bn had begun redeploying its headquarters and much of its heavy equipment back to assembly areas in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the 60th EOD had dispatched teams to different areas to support search and destroy operations by other 82nd DIV (ABN) units.

[25] Detailed in 37th EN Bn Operations Log, 24 February to 10 Mar 1991.

[26] Unit 1SG stated, "Each platoon had M-8 on at all times." Lead Sheet 843, July 1996.

[27] MOPP (mission oriented protective posture) ensemble is worn at certain levels, from 0 (nothing) to 4 (mask with hood, Battle Dress Overgarment (BDO), butyl rubber gloves and overshoes). (Army manual FM 17-15, App. D, Section II).

[28] These " checks" were described by the NBC NCO to consist of performing M256 kit tests.

[29] Interview with EOD NCOIC, Lead Sheet 806, June 1996.

[30] 37th EN Bn Operations Log, 24 February to 10 Mar 1991.

[31] Both the 37th EN Bn and the 307th EN Bn lacked sufficient explosives to completely destroy all the warehouses and bunkers in Khamisiyah. In order to complete the task, the engineers made use of the explosives they found on-site; most of this explosive material consisted of the Soviet version of military C-4 explosive. 37th EN Bn message, SUBJ: Time Fuze, 4 March 1991.

[32] MAJ Huber's statement on CBS Evening News, February 12, 1997.

[33] Number of bunkers rigged is based on Unit commander's personal log entries and Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[34] Interviews with 37th EN Bn CSM and Commander, Lead Sheet 819, June 1996 and Interview Notes, June 1996.

[35] 37th EN Bn Operations Log, 24 February to 10 Mar 1991.

[36] Photograph of 4 March 1991 explosion at Khamisiyah showing flag blowing.

[37] MOPP level of protection was reduced (from level 2 to 0 ) based on the cessation of hostilities. The XVIII Corps (ABN) Desert Shield Chronology , February 1991, 271940Z February 1991 entry. (Higher MOPP levels were used when a unit was initially entering the bunker areas. 37th EN Bn NBC NCO interview and Lead Sheet 1094, October 1996.)

[38] EOD NCO interview, Lead Sheet 1077, October 1996.

[39] EOD NCO interview, Lead Sheet 1077, October 1996.

[40] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[41] Interview of NCO and commander, Lead Sheets 825 and 832, June 1996

[42] This information regarding negative detections is what is known to date and may be modified as the result of survey information. In January 1997, surveys were sent to people believed to have been within 50km of Khamisiyah, seeking additional information.

[43] Statement by Commander, 307th Medical Bn.

[44] Reports indicate fragments fell in the area for 5 to 30 minutes, and secondary explosions of munitions continued for 24 hours. Personal interviews, Unit NCO interview, Lead Sheet 1223, January 1997.

[45] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[46] This review of demolition techniques was, in part, prompted by a reported lack of explosives available to the engineers, concern about the amount of secondary explosions, and the extent of unexploded ordnance (UXO) caused by the March 4, 1991 demolition. Interview with unit commander, Lead Sheet 1266, January 1997, and 37th EN Bn mission update, March 1991.

[47] This unit, along with another team from the 60th EOD, arrived at Khamisiyah on 4 March 1991. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[48] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 5 March 1991, p.4.

[49] The test explosions did not produce the desired results. However, it was decided to change the charger method from individual bunkers to a singular ring main that included all the warehouses and bunkers. The net result would be one large explosion versus individual explosions timed to go off at approximately the same time. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[50] The IAD does not have any detailed inventories of what was actually in the ASP bunkers and warehouses. Personnel on site have stated there was not sufficient time to do an exact count of munitions, and that most of the containers had Arabic writing, which was indecipherable to the troops. IAD does have an aggregate inventory report from the 307th EN Bn and 82nd DIV (ABN) reports, and videotape showing inside some bunkers. 307th EN Bn Operations Summary, and 60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)

[51] Interviews with BN S-3, Lead Sheet 1053, October 1996 307th Liaison Officer, and Lead Sheet 1221, January 1997.

[52] HHC S-2 NCO interview, Lead Sheet 857, July 1996.

[53] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[54] HHC S-2 NCO interview, Lead Sheet 857, July 1996 and EOD NCO interview, Lead Sheets 910 and 1077, September and October 1996, respectively.

[55] 60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm), 1 April 1991.

[56] EOD NCO interview, Lead Sheet 910, September 1996.

[57] This conflict in reports gives rise to the question of whether there was more than one "big explosion." IAD continues to seek identification of the individual soldiers involved in the demolition so as to resolve that question.

[58] The 37th EN Bn (-) continued to the assembly area (AA ELM) to link-up with the remainder of their soldiers in preparation for redeployment to Ft. Bragg. Operations Log, 37th EN Bn for 24 February to 10 March 1991.

[59] The remainder of the 307th EN Bn arrived in Khamisiyah 11-12 March 1991 from Tallil. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[60] XVIII Corps CTOC Journal Sheet, 12 March 1991

[61] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[62] Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory, (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), p.326

[63] 307th EN Bn Desert Storm Narrative, 17 May 1991.

[64] VII Corps FRAGO # 189-91, 27 March 1991

[65] VII Corps Tactical Chemical Spot Report, 28 March 1991

[66] Report in unit history file states other U.S. unit was conducting demolition mission at Tallil Air Base.

[67] 84th EN Co. Commander's comments in the Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.

[68] A provision of UN Security Council Resolution 687 established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) whose primary Objectiveective was to identify Iraqi chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles which survived the war, have them moved to an Iraqi destruction facility, or to destroy the weapons themselves. UN Security Council Resolution 687

[69] Redacted Message, 12 November 1991.

[70] Mr. Denny Ross, CBS News, 12 February 1997.

[71] S/23268, Letter from Executive Chairman, Office of the Special Commission, 4 December 1991, p. 2.

[72] Redacted CIA declassified message, 12 November 1991.

[73] Redacted CIA declassified message, 20 November 1991.

[74] Memorandum, XX February 1997, Discussions with the 24 ID G-2 staff.

[75] Unclassified UNSCOM Press Release,1 April 1992

[76] Reuters News Agency summary, Subject: Iraq-Chemical, 25 June 1992.

[77] Letter responding to Congressman Browder's request, UNSCOM, 5 April 1994 and Appendix IV, UN Document S/25977

[78] Transcript of Hearing, Senate Banking Committee, 25 May 1994, pp. 135-137. Mr. Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel, Dr. Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Weapons, and Dr. John Kriese, Chief Officer for Ground Forces, Defense Intelligence Agency.

[79] Responses to questions for the record submitted to Congressman Riegle on 22 September and 5 October 1994

[80] The Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, p. 32, June 1994.

[81] Public Law 102-190, DoD to Establish PG Registry, and Public Law 102-585, Sec. 704, Expansion of Coverage of Persian Gulf Registry. The original registry was developed to identify veterans exposed to the Kuwait oil well fires.

[82] DoD News release, ref. # 116-95, 9 Mar 95.

[83] CIA Chronology of Khamisiyah Events, transmitted to Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Executive Director, CIA on 24 January 1997.

[84] CIA Chronology of Khamisiyah Events, transmitted to Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Executive Director, CIA on 24 January 1997.

[85] Established by Executive Order 12961.

[86] Executive Director of CIA testimony before the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, 9 January 1997.

[87] Mr. Martin had previously testified before the House Committee of Veteran Affairs in November 1993, where he described his illness and reported that he had witnessed a scud attack, saw dead animals, took pyridostigmine, and was exposed to diesel fuel. Additionally, in May 1994, after release of the Riegle Committee report, DoD contacted him to ask if he thought he could have been exposed to chemical agents and, if so, how. He cited three possible sources of exposure: the scud attack at Wadi Al Batin, the dead animals, and smoke from a bunker destruction near An Nasiriyah.

[88] IAD obtained an original, uncut version of the videotape from Mr. Martin's Company Commander, Major Huber.

[89] Extract from Testimony of Executive Officer, Office of Weapons Technology and Proliferation, CIA, to the PAC, 1 May 1996.

[90] DoD News Briefing, 21 June 96.

[91] The ESG database is known not to be definitive. See the PAC Report, January 1997, p. 30.

[92] Statement by CIA Executive Director at News Conference on Persian Gulf Veterans Illnesses, 1 November 1996.

[93] CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses, 2 August 1996, and DefenseLINK News Release 681-96, 20 December 1996.

[94] DefenseLINK News Release, Reference Number 681-96, 20 December 1996.

[95] Copy of letter sent to vets.

[96] Copy of survey sent to vets.

[97] Based on locations reported for battalion-level Unit Identification Codes (UICs) derived from the Geographic Information System (GIS) [UIC-based personnel strengths from the Defense Manpower Data Center(DMDC).]

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